NerdWork

Rex A. Childers, PhD

I focus on the exercise of American power in the world, both “hard” and “soft" (whether it is “smart power” or not is another question). My experience as a U.S. Army veteran, business owner, and university instructor informs my views and scholarly interests, reading habits, and the content on this site. Having experienced life outside of the United States, both in the developed and developing world, the question of “American Exceptionalism” (the founding ideas, U.S. Constitution, amendments and critical restatements of principles as the nation grappled with social, political, and personal challenges) remains at the forefront of my intellectual curiosity. I approach foreign relations history from a rational choice perspective, incorporating principles from game theory and adding in cultural and social analysis accessing Social Capital Theory with its emphasis on associations, networks, trust, and the role of these factors in achieving core and peripheral American national interests.

For a look at some of my past work on American foreign relations, please feel free to visit the links listed below. Academic Jargon Warning: Several of these are online documents written to complete advanced degrees, requiring some use of theoretical and conceptual structures - The abstracts for the works give a brief description, and the Table of Contents are also good clues to skip to the most interesting sections for reading!

Cold Warriors, Good Neighbors, Smart Power: U.S. Army, Berlin, 1961-1994, completed PhD dissertation, Beth A. Griech-Polelle, Advisor, Bowling Green State University, 2015. 359 pages. Available online at
http://maurice.bgsu.edu/record=b3989197~S9 or click on button below.

ABSTRACT: The end of the Cold War and the manner in which it was "won" by the Allied nations ignited debate over the utility of military power as a source of American leadership in the new unipolar world. A popular theme arose, that a new form of state power, soft power, had the capacity to achieve America's interests as it prepared to enter the 21st century. The idea that expensive and dangerous technologies could be replaced by investments in peaceful means of influence, wielded by America's foreign policy professionals to foster a new cooperative spirit in the world, was naturally attractive. The United States could be relieved of much of its global military presence and reduce its military's intrusions upon foreign people and their cultures. This dissertation challenges the assumption that the impact of military stationing in the Cold War was limited to hard power. In the case of the U.S. Army in Berlin, the unit and its members practiced civic, social, cultural, and political behaviors that meet the criteria of the post-Cold War branded term, soft power. In their daily interactions with Berliners, they exercised the full spectrum of foreign policy smart power tools, as Cold Warrior defenders of West Berlin and in compliance with U.S. Army, Europe's directive for all soldiers and their family members to act as Good Neighbors to the Germans in the city. The unit's command designed institutional structures to enhance its ability to project power, and these networks became the basis for intentional actions to improve its Social Capital in the isolated city. In fact, these networks, controlled by the Army in Berlin, changed the dynamics of the occupied-occupier relationship and provided West Berlin's civic leadership its first formal step toward balancing the relational power calculations with its lawful occupiers. As a policy history case study, it may be useful to the U.S. military as a fresh perspective on the spectrum of power behaviors evident in its own historical records. The usefulness of this study is subject to the recognition that the experience in West Berlin, while ultimately successful, occurred in a particular period and cultural context. For U.S. policymakers seeking a broader range of choices in a future scenario requiring a hard power capability on the ground while offering a path to a soft power component possibility, Army Berlin's critical crisis assessments and long-term practices might be instructive. Policymakers who restrict their choices in the early estimation process based upon the limitations assumed in modern power theory may benefit from a broader understanding that does not exclude the force that necessarily absorbs much of the foreign policy budget. Under certain circumstances and in the proper context, the manpower, social, and cultural strength of the United States military, through its leaders, members, and dependents, has advanced the national interest effectively and without resorting to its hard power capabilities.

The Rationality of Nonconformity: The United States Decision to Refuse Ratification of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 1949, completed MA thesis, Gary A. Hess, Chair, Bowling Green State University, 2008. 117 pages. available online at http://maurice.bgsu.edu/record=b2939449~S9 or click button below.

ABSTRACT: On December 12, 1977, the U.S. signed a treaty offered through the ICRC entitled Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977. This treaty drastically altered the relationship between individual behavior in warfare and combatant status. For the United States, the impact of domestic political tensions, the fresh and painful experience in Vietnam, and a continued emphasis on Détente all played parts in the decision to participate in the conference and sign the treaty. Signature during the Carter administration would not be followed by ratification, and would be rejected by subsequent administrations. Was this decision, continued through every administration to date, a simple outcome of a rogue nation exercising its sovereign right based upon its own ability to wage war, or is there more to the story? In this thesis, a new analysis of the political processes and environment surrounding the final treaty's outcomes is offered. The global tensions between superpowers are examined, emphasizing the United States response, in the context of its perceptions of the treaty's requirements. A broader coalition of actors, both state and non-state, would ultimately hold the key to the treaty's significance to conventional warfare. The Global South engaged the issue of lawful behavior in war with a distinct set of outcomes in mind. Their ability to gain agency, build effective coalitions addressing inequities in the asymmetry of warfare that had historically disadvantaged them, and then alter the outcomes of international humanitarian law through democratic practices, are placed in the context of rational choice theory. The logical and methodical approach used by these actors to deconstruct the central premise of conventional warfare distinctions between combatants and noncombatants, consistently the hallmark of advancing improvements in international humanitarian law, resulted in a treaty reversing advancements in civilian protections through a new set of dangerous behaviors made allowable for a new category of privileged combatants (organized resistance movements). The United State's options were limited, and a new and regressive standard for conventional warfare was instituted.

“World War II’s International Humanitarian Law legacy: A history of hopeful progress and regressive diplomacy based upon ‘military necessity’”. Paper presented at the 2013 Society for Military History Annual Conference, March 15, 2103, New Orleans.